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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4509 
___________ 
 
MUAMMER VAROL, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PAVE-RITE, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00422) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 24, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Muammer Varol appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey’s order dismissing his complaint.  Because this appeal does not 
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present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In 2010, Varol filed a charge with the EEOC, asserting that his former employer, 
Pave-Rite, Inc. (“Pave-Rite”), had discriminated against him based on his race, religion, 
and national origin.1
 Varol’s complaint, which consisted of a form EEOC complaint and a written 
statement, was less than clear.  Other than checking the boxes on the EEOC form 
identifying that he had been discriminated on due to his race, religion, and nationality, 
Varol’s complaint provided no indication that he had been discriminated against based on 
any protected ground.  Rather, his written statement asserted that he had intermittently 
worked for Pave-Rite as a dump truck driver since 2004, and that his supervisors always 
found “something to blame on him,” “pushed him to make mistakes,” and tried to get him 
to quit.  In January 2007, he asked Pave-Rite principal, Peter Stires, for a leave of 
absence without pay to deal with personal problems and so that he “could make a fresh 
start a couple months later.”  He asserted that Stires became angry and blocked his 
attempt to obtain unemployment benefits by stating that he had quit voluntarily.  
  The EEOC dismissed the charge and issued Varol a right to sue 
letter in January 2011.  Varol soon thereafter filed a complaint in the District Court, 
seemingly claiming that Pave-Rite’s failure to rehire him was discriminatory under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.   
                                              
1 Varol is Muslim and Turkish.  
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Throughout 2007 and 2008, Varol was unable to find work and became homeless.  In 
April 2009, he was rehired as a dump truck driver for Pave-Rite but was again harassed.  
Varol nevertheless “finish[ed] the season” and worked until December 2009.  He called 
Pave-Rite in March 2010 to inquire about a job, and the next month Stires hired him to 
work for two days.  Varol, however, hurt his knee on the first day of work and was 
unable to work on the second day.  A medical examination of his knee showed no serious 
problems, and he was able to work a few days later.  About a month later, he worked one 
more day for Pave-Rite.  He subsequently learned that Pave-Rite had hired another driver 
to work full-time.   
 Pave-Rite moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  In July 2011, the District Court held oral argument on the 
motion to dismiss,2
                                              
2 It appears that the District Court held oral argument rather than requiring Varol to file a 
written response to the motion because Varol was homeless and had difficultly 
complying with the filing requirements. 
 during which Varol attempted to introduce additional facts.  The 
District Court adjourned the hearing and converted the motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment.  The District Court thereafter accepted an affidavit from Stires, 
and in September 2011 held a hearing to gather more facts from Varol to determine if he 
had a cognizable claim.  Varol testified that he thought the new driver hired by Pave-Rite 
was of “Spanish background,” and when asked about the basis of the alleged 
discriminatory treatment, Varol stated that his supervisors did not want him to work there 
because he “was taking one of the American people[s] job[s].”   
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 On December 1, 2011, the District Court granted Pave-Rite’s motion to dismiss.3
 Varol now appeals. 
  
The District Court explained that he neither set forth any of the elements for a prima facie 
Title VII discrimination case nor “identif[ied] any statement, action, or circumstance 
where [he] was treated differently because of his protected status.”  It continued by 
stating that Varol did not “establish[] any causal link between [his] alleged discriminatory 
treatment and [his] race, national origin or religion.”  Regarding Varol’s statement that a 
“Spanish driver” may have been hired instead of him, the District Court stated that “this 
vague allegation of hiring a non-Muslim driver is not sufficient . . . to show 
discrimination.”  It also concluded that allowing Varol to amend his complaint would be 
futile, as he “was permitted to add evidence at two hearings and failed to do so.” 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.  Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Varol is proceeding pro se, we construe his 
filings liberally.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
 A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
                                              
3 The District Court explained that it was converting the motion for summary judgment 
back to a motion to dismiss.  While this is not usual practice, it was appropriate here 
because, after taking Varol’s testimony in lieu of requiring response briefs, the District 
Court determined that he failed to state a claim for relief. 
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550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 
1949 (2009).   See also Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 176-177 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the Twombly/Iqbal standard).  We have 
stated that Twombly’s “plausibility paradigm . . . applies with equal force to analyzing 
the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., 
Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
 As the District Court concluded, Varol did not articulate any cause of action under 
Title VII.  He failed to set forth the elements for a prima facie case of discrimination, and 
did not include any facts that could be discerned to state a facially plausible right to 
relief.  Accordingly, dismissal of the complaint was proper.  Additionally, the District 
Court did not err by dismissing the complaint without affording leave to amend, as it 
provided Varol with two opportunities to support his complaint through testimony and 
determined that further amendment would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that district court must extend the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend before dismissing a complaint unless amendment would 
be inequitable or futile). 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
